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 I.
 
Introduction
 ecuring 
 
a
  
hospital network is challenging. 
Doctors and physicians often require special 
needs, and external vendor systems require 
agreements that pose restrictions on possible security 
controls. In addition, hospitals have many of the same 
challenges other organizations struggle with. Improper 
management of systems and network defenses can 
expose private information and credit card numbers to 
attackers. This can violate laws and regulations, cause 
negative publicity, impact the financial stability of the 
business, and hinder the ability to provide care to 
patients.
 
Effective security requires many working parts in 
an organization, not all of which are technical solutions. 
Defined process, skilled and well-managed personnel, 
and management support are vital aspects of security. 
Many hospitals fail to address one or more of these 
aspects, leaving their network open from multiple attack 
vectors.
 
Security breaches may also hinder a hospital's 
ability to adequately care for its patients, or admit new 
patients. Viruses and
 
other attacks can cause medical 
record systems to be disabled, forcing hospitals to 
revert to a paper system and decreasing efficiency. In 
some cases, incidents can prevent hospitals from 
providing adequate care. In these cases, ambulances 
may have to be rerouted to other medical facilities in the 
area, losing business and endangering those who need 
immediate care. 
II. Defining ‘Security’ 
First, when we refer to ‘security’ throughout this 
research paper, we are referencing IT security, not 
physical or some other type. Security is often defined as 
protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
data, but the interpretation and context of these aspects 
will change from organization to organization. 
Rather than creating an overall definition of ‘security’, we 
will define it in terms of several goals. When we refer to 
‘security’ throughout this paper, we will mean 
technology, processes, procedures, and organizational 
structures that:  
 Ensure the confidentiality, availability and integrity of 
electronic/digitized assets and data, especially PHI. 
 Ensure the ability to provide quality care to hospital 
patients through the use of technology. 
 Minimize the impact of security threats against the 
needs of the business. 
We hope to represent the flexible and intangible 
nature of security, especially in a hospital environment, 
by defining ‘security’ as a collection of goals, rather than 
an absolute state. As we will show later, security events 
can be quantified in terms of risk, which must either be 
accepted or not for each hospital dependent on 
individual tolerance. Some hospitals may accept more 
risk while defining themselves as ‘secure’, while others 
will accept less risk. It is not a term that can be 
absolutely defined, and we make no attempt to 
represent it as such. We simply present one useful 
definition for our purposes here. 
 
Many approaches to network and computer 
security focus purely on better technology. By increasing 
the effectiveness of anti-virus, web proxies, intrusion 
detection, and other technologies, attacks can 
theoretically be prevented over the network. In reality, 
this is not the case. The true problem of network and 
computer security in hospitals is not with the current 
technology solutions available on the market. The 
problem is with the way security is understood, 
accepted, and implemented by the people within the 
hospital. Communication between security teams and 
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Abstract - Hospital IT security presents many unique 
challenges that must be solved by the entire organization. 
Network and computer threats can cause thousands of dollars 
in lost time and resources, legal repercussions, and damaged 
reputation. Despite warnings from a wealth of public breach 
notifications, many hospitals are inadequately prepared to 
deal with today's computer-based attacks. This research 
explores the root causes of hospital network and computer in 
security, and addresses these problems with methods 
implemented in actual hospitals. A lack of comprehension of 
methods to assess and implement security measures by 
hospital IT security employees can hinder network visibility and 
prevent their ability to stop threats. In addition, these same 
people are unable to express security concerns in terms 
management can understand, harming their credibility within 
the business as a whole. Without this sup- port, organizational 
change is impossible. By addressing these concerns with a 
combination of people, process, and tools, we can solve 
complex problems, protect patient data, and ensure IT 
operations so hospitals can serve their community and save 
lives.
Author : Computer Science Department.
E-mail : Manoj_19143@ rediffmail.com
upper-level management is a driving factor for this 
problem. As we will show, management support is 
required for any major change in an organization, 
because many security changes affect the entire 
organization. If this support is missing, many changes 
are ineffective or incomplete. Our approach seeks to 
address both the technical issues as well as 
communication issues. It meets the needs of the 
organization while defending its most important assets. 
It provides the flexibility and resiliency to cope with the 
changing world of computer and network security, and 
addresses the complex factors involved in security for a 
large organization. Our method contains multiple 
stages. First, hospitals must understand the specific 
challenges they face. Next, specific methods will be 
used for assessing a hospital's security and risk posture. 
Once these are complete, other methods can be used 
to consistently improve IT security in these 
organizations. In the final section, case studies will 
illustrate the success of the method. It was implemented 
in several hospitals who have all reached various levels 
of maturity. 
IV.  Hospital Security 
a) Implementation 
As discussed previously, security within an 
organization is a combination of people, process, and 
tools. Technical controls - tools - provide a means to 
restrict and regulate the network. Process defines 
standards by which the organization implements and 
enforces security controls. Finally, the people, including 
politics between departments, the culture of the 
organization, and simply their communication, are 
ultimately responsible for security. All three are 
necessary to protect the hospital network. The 
assessment phase helps the hospital understand its 
current security posture. Using the data obtained, 
security exposures can be identified, and then 
corrected. The methods described in this chapter 
include many specific technical controls that must be 
implemented to provide a reasonable degree of 
security. Beyond these controls, most hospitals struggle 
with communication and internal politics. Lower level 
security employees cannot communicate appropriately 
with upper level management, which will allow them to 
obtain the support they need for security initiatives. 
V.  Specific Technical Controls 
Every hospital must have a set of technical 
controls to protect their network. They must also have 
the proper personnel and management support to drive 
the change necessary to implement and enforce the 
controls. A list of controls have been defined below that 
will drastically improve security for most hospitals. Each 
of these controls can be implemented in many ways. No 
particular vendor or implementation is recommended, 
although several are mentioned as examples. These are 
details that must be worked out for each individual 
hospital to solve their specific needs. 
a) Web Filtering 
The majority of successful attacks today expose 
vulnerabilities in web browsers. These can be attacks 
against the browser itself (such as Internet Explorer or 
Mozilla Firefox), but they can also exploit other services 
utilized by the browser such as Java or Adobe Flash. As 
such, normal web browsing creates a large security risk 
for any hospital. To help protect against these specific 
attacks, web filtering appliances can be purchased from 
many vendors. It is also possible to use an open source 
tool, such as Snort, to create a custom web filter, but 
most organizations opt to purchase a pre-built solution.  
 
Control 1: All web browser traffic must be filtered 
through a web gateway or proxy appliance.  
 
Web filters generally work using blacklists. This 
approach blocks specific web traffic based on content 
signatures, DNS name, IP address, or other static rules. 
Any traffic that does not specifically match is allowed by 
default. Some web filters act as an enterprise-wide anti-
virus solution. For example, McAfee's Web Gateway[19] 
searches for content matching known viruses. Due to 
the prominence of attacks originating from web 
browsing, a web filter is absolutely necessary for any 
hospital. 
b) Email Filtering 
The primary responsibility of an email filter is 
often to reduce or eliminate spam for an organization, 
and minimize viruses and other threats. Email attacks 
can trick a user into opening a malicious web link or 
attachment, but they can also attempt to get a user to 
divulge sensitive information. To prevent most spam and 
malicious emails, we can use a dedicated email filter, 
such as Cisco IronPort[9]. 
 
Control 2: All email must be filtered through a dedicated 
email server to remove spam and malicious 
attachments. 
 
 
c) System Patching 
Most virus-related incidents in hospitals can be 
prevented with effective patch management. Most 
hospitals have thousands of computing devices on their 
network, a large percentage of which are running some 
version of Microsoft Windows. Many security 
vulnerabilities are discovered each month for Windows 
that can allow an attacker to successfully exploit and 
compromise a system. Because new vulnerabilities are 
discovered at a high rate, it becomes equally important 
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Like the web filter, this approach may not 
prevent all attacks, but we can use it to help reduce the 
attack surface of the organization.
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 : Microsoft Bulletin - Count of likely exploitable 
vulnerabilities per month in 2010  
Control 3:
 
Automatic patching must be implemented 
and enforced for all computer systems on the network. 
Sensitive systems or systems that cannot utilize an 
automatic system must have a patching procedure in 
place.
 
Microsoft Windows is not the only attack surface 
that requires regular patching. Adobe products (Flash, 
Acrobat Reader, Shockwave, etc.), Java, Apple 
Quicktime, and any other popular software are often 
discovered
 
to have severe security vulnerabilities as 
well. Other operating systems, such as many Linux 
variants or Mac OS X release patches for newly 
discovered security vulnerabilities, although these are 
exploited less often due to a smaller user base. Finally, 
many medical system vendors prohibit hospitals from 
installing patches on their computer systems, even if the 
hospital owns the system. They instead require the 
hospital wait for the vendor to patch the system for new 
vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, many of
 
these systems 
never get patched once they are installed in the hospital 
environment. To combat this, other controls must 
protect these systems, such as network segregation 
and strict policy surrounding their usage.
 
d)
 
Anti-Virus
 
Anti-virus is primarily the last defense against an 
attack. When all other con-
 
trols have failed, a local anti-
virus installation can detect and block malicious code 
before it is able to compromise and infect a system. 
When referring to `anti-virus' in this paper, it should be 
considered a program which tries to detect and prevent 
any type of malicious attack on an end-point system. 
This can include Trojan Horses, viruses, worms, adware, 
spyware, and any type of attack normal enterprise anti-
virus can detect and prevent. Anti-virus is
 
most useful on 
Microsoft Windows computers. Solutions do exist for 
Linux and OS X, such as ClamAV[10] for Linux and 
Sophos[33] for OS X, but they typically provide less 
value to hospitals, who have a high number of Windows 
systems in the network environment. 
 
 
Control 4:
 
Anti-virus must be installed and up-to-date on 
end systems.
 
 
Anti-virus should be installed on any Microsoft 
Windows system with adequate resources. 
Administrators often forgo installing it on high load 
servers for fear it will adversely impact performance. 
This is a risk that can be accepted provided other 
controls protect the system. Like system patching, many 
medical system vendors prohibit hospitals from 
installing anti-virus solutions on their systems. Their 
reasons include performance concerns and unintended 
side effects. When this occurs, other controls must 
adequately protect these systems. The hospital should 
ensure that anti-virus is updated regularly to the latest 
software versions. This includes the anti-virus installation 
itself, but it also includes virus signatures released 
regularly from the vendor. This ensures the system can 
be protected from the latest known threats. Despite 
providing a valuable control, anti-virus is still limited by 
its signature definitions. It can only
 
detect and protect a 
system from known threats. Polymorphic viruses and 
new attacks will bypass anti-virus and are still capable of 
compromising a system.
 
e)
 
External Device Control
 
Any device capable of easily and physically 
carrying data inside or outside the hospital network can 
be classified as an \external device". This includes both 
hospital provided and personal laptops, and removable 
media such as USB ash drives or external hard drives. 
These devices can be connected to insecure networks 
outside of hospital control, which can cause them to 
become infected with a virus or other malicious 
software. Upon returning to the internal hospital network, 
the malicious code can then attack the internal network 
and company resources. Hospitals should also be 
concerned with data ex-
 
filtration. A laptop is capable of 
carrying PHI outside the network, which can lead to a 
security incident if not adequately controlled. 
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that we are able to apply patches that correct these 
vulnerabilities. Figure 4.1.3 shows the number of 
vulnerabilities released per month for Microsoft products 
that were rated `Consistent Exploit Code Likely' by their 
Exploitability Index [20]. This rating means\analysis has 
shown that exploit code could be created in such a way 
that an attacker could consistently exploit that 
vulnerability."[20] Also included is a tally of those 
vulnerabilities that were being actively exploited on the 
Internet at the time Microsoft released the monthly 
bulletin     announcing     the    vulnerabilities.    [21]  This 
measurement shows that sometimes a vulnerability is 
being exploited before a patch is even available. This 
increases the urgency for applying a patch to vulnerable 
systems.
Control 5 : Only hospital provided and controlled PCs 
should be allowed to connect to the internal network. 
USBs and other forms of removable media should be 
tightly controlled, and ideally completely restricted. 
 
While company policy can provide some 
mitigation of this threat, it may not be a strong deterrent 
for many employees or other outside personnel 
(consultants, guests, etc.). Effective technical solutions 
tend to be expensive and difficult to implement. One 
example is Cisco's Network Access Control (NAC), 
which is certainly expensive, but when configured 
properly can protect against external devices. 
 
Laptops and other hospital resources (hard 
drives, USB sticks, etc.) carrying sensitive data must be 
fully encrypted if they can be taken outside hospital 
property. This is especially important for laptops or any 
device that may be a target for thieves. Many HITECH 
breach incidents[14] were related to stolen hard drives, 
USB sticks, or laptops containing personal data. In such 
cases, companies must disclose the data loss to the 
public, and then pay for remediation. With encryption, 
the only loss is the physical hardware. 
 
Control 6: External devices storing sensitive data must 
be encrypted. 
f) Secure Wireless Access 
Wireless access points provide convenience for 
hospital employees and outside guests. The signal for 
access points is broadcast over the air, which can allow 
anyone within range to view and attempt to connect to 
the network. Without proper controls, an intruder could 
gain access to sensitive resources or disrupt network 
operations. Primarily, employee wireless access should 
be encrypted with enterprise WPA2 using a central 
RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Ser- vice) 
or AAA (Authentication, Authorization, Accounting) 
server. This provides a strong level of encryption and 
allows employee access to be controlled with a central 
server. Guest wireless access is typically unencrypted 
and open in most hospitals. This allows anyone, even 
attackers, to connect to the network. To prevent a 
malicious user from compromising the internal hospital 
network, the guest network should be on a completely 
separate network. Without restrictions on the guest 
wireless network, employees can also connect to this 
open network and bypass normal internal network filters 
(such as web filters or tight firewall rules). This can lead 
to employees accessing Internet resources that should 
be restricted. It is also possible external users can 
detect and attack an employee system connected in this 
way. To prevent this, WPA/WPA2 encryption should be 
enabled on the guest network, even if it uses a simple 
and publicly available encryption key. Employee 
systems should also be denied access to this network 
by using a network access control tool like Cisco NAC. 
g) Firewall Configuration 
Numerous resources exist explaining how to 
properly configure an enterprise firewall for security. This 
is only mentioned for posterity. Firewalls should be 
configured as restrictively as possible. Internal systems 
should not have unrestricted access to the external 
Internet. Direct access from the external Internet should 
be prohibited to the internal hospital network. A 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) should be designated for 
allowing external Internet access to resources hosted on 
the hospital network. The DMZ must be restricted from 
accessing the internal network. 
 
Control 7: Firewalls should be properly configured to be 
as restrictive as possible. 
VI.
 
Other Controls
 
Most hospitals struggle to implement and 
maintain even
 
basic controls, and the broad range of 
controls we listed above attempt to solve the most 
common areas of exposure. They should be 
implemented on any hospital network. However, many 
other controls should be used to provide more granular 
protections. As an
 
example, passwords should be 
complex and changed regularly (as defined and 
accepted by company policy). This is a minor control 
that can be implemented with Microsoft Active Directory, 
and its definition can change per individual hospital. 
There are different ways to provide authorization to 
resources, such as Active Directory for network shares, 
or specific configurations for individual systems. 
Generally, users should be given minimal access to the 
resources they need to do their jobs. External Internet 
access should be restricted, internal server resources 
should be restricted, and individual workstation access 
should be restricted. By providing minimal access, we 
limit the exposure surface of the hospital computer and 
network resources. Technical controls help protect the 
hospital network. However, they are only one aspect of 
securing a network. The next section will discuss the 
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Ideally, in the case of an external laptop or other 
computer, a technical solution will detect an attempt to 
connect to the network. It will then run through a series 
of checks before allowing the device to communicate 
with the rest of the network. These checks can include 
system patch levels, anti-virus installation and version, 
and other software checks. If the system passes, it is 
allowed to connect. If not, it must correct the problems 
before it can access the internal network. To correct the 
problems, a separate VLAN is often utilized to allow the 
user to download patches or other requirements. 
Software controls can be used to prevent users from 
using unauthorized external media. Super glue can also 
physically seal the USB drives of a computer, although 
we do not recommend this.
human aspect of security, which must be successful in 
order to meet the constantly changing security world. 
VII. Security Personnel 
The technical controls in the previous section 
provide strong protection against many forms of attack, 
but it is equally important to address the people side of 
security. Politics between differing groups and 
individuals, as well as the culture of the organization, 
play a role in security. Individual knowledge and skill are 
important as well. Hospitals are no different than any 
other organization in this manner. Low level security 
personnel are essential for implementing and 
maintaining security controls and providing creative 
solutions to problems. In addition, management must 
actively support and enforce security initiatives. The 
interaction between these groups has an effect on how 
security is implemented within the hospital. In this 
section, guidelines will be provided for structuring the 
security of a hospital. Also, when groups within an 
organization communicate effectively, they can solve 
security problems. 
VIII. Security Team 
The security team is tasked with administering 
and reviewing the security systems at the hospital. Not 
only do members of the security team configure and 
maintain appliances, systems, and security software 
throughout the organization, but they must also review 
logs and other reports for security incidents. They think 
and make decisions about security for the hospital, 
although final approval may defer to a manager or 
director. Members of the security team generally 
administer major security systems at the hospital such 
as firewalls, web filtering appliances, email and spam 
filters, IDS/IPS appliances, vulnerability scanning, central 
logging systems, anti-virus, and patch management 
systems. In many cases they will have other 
responsibilities that may or may not directly impact the 
security of the organization. Hospitals often do not have 
the resources to have dedicated security personnel 
without other responsibilities. In many cases, the 
members of the security team will not be directly 
responsible for administering a system that has an 
impact on security. This could be a weakness 
discovered from a vulnerability scan, a new web server 
that will be placed on the DMZ, or any number of IT 
operational items. When this occurs, members of the 
security team must work with other members of the 
organization to implement or maintain a system. They 
can provide advice on the security of the system, as well 
as test it to ensure it functions as intended. Good inter-
departmental relationships are vital for this to be a 
success. When dealing with another department the 
security team will often rely on their manager or director. 
In some cases, a formal security team has not been 
established for the hospital. If this is the case, a security 
team should be created. When selecting team 
members, choosing personnel who already administer 
many of the devices and systems mentioned above can 
be a good idea. However, this selection is often decided 
by an already existing IT manager. The members must 
be trustworthy and reasonably knowledgeable about 
security. The team must also include a manager with the 
authority to make decisions acting the network 
infrastructure of the organization, and he or she must 
also be able to raise concerns with higher level 
management when necessary. When a team is 
established, they can begin to discuss and handle many 
of the responsibilities required of this team. Weekly 
meetings are often worth- while to ensure that everyone 
and the manager is on the same page. Formal policies 
must also be defined around this team and they must 
work with the organization to get these policies and 
responsibilities accepted. The security team is also 
responsible for thinking about and solving IT security 
problems for the hospital. Some problems may be 
directly solvable by members of the security team, while 
others must be delegated to outside groups through 
management. For example, a security team member 
may be directly responsible for the management of the 
hospital firewall, and can make any adjustments as 
necessary. This depends on the expertise of the 
individual team members. In some cases, the security 
team may only need to provide recommendations to 
other groups within the hospital. The security team 
should meet regularly, usually once per week. In each 
meeting the security team should assess the current 
state of computer and network security for the hospital, 
then address any new or ongoing initiatives. The team 
should always explore ways to improve the hospital's 
security, even if improvements are not forthcoming. It is 
then the manager's responsibility to best utilize the 
resources at his disposal and drive the initiatives of the 
security team.  
IX.  Management Support 
Strong and efficacious network security begins 
with management support. The security manager 
oversees the security team and is responsible for 
ensuring resources are focused where necessary. This 
can be a balancing act between security responsibilities 
and normal IT responsibilities. The manager must also 
ensure that team members are consistently reviewing 
security data and reports so incidents are noticed and 
duly investigated. The security team must be supported 
further by an executive at the director or higher position 
(like Chief Information Security Oficer). The director must 
handle funding for the security program. They must also 
understand IT security risk and be able to present this 
effectively to the rest of the organization. Most 
importantly, they must help the security team navigate 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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the politics and culture of the entire hospital. Without 
support from the rest of the organization at a high level, 
the security team will be hindered during investigations 
and response, they will not be able to enforce policy, 
and they will not get proper funding. Management 
support is required to get the resources necessary, both 
in personnel and monetary, to efficiently and effectively 
deal with security problems. Their support is also 
needed for policy change and enforcement. "Those with 
the power to allocate resources, both financial and the 
time of employees, can control any change expressed 
from lower in the power structure. 
 
 
Figure 2 :  An example hospital organizational structure  
 X.  Conclusion 
Hospitals have many of the same IT security 
problems experienced by other organizations, but with 
added complications from doctors, external vendor 
systems, patient records, and specific legislation. They 
also struggle with insufficient resources and often lack 
comprehensive expertise to cover all areas of security. 
Ineffective communication between low level security 
personnel and management can cause misplaced 
priorities and misguided initiatives. Securing a hospital 
network requires a combination of technical controls, 
policies and processes, and responsibility among the 
people of the organization. By first understanding the 
hospital network and its resources, then by quantitatively 
measuring the IT security risk and understanding areas 
of exposure, a strong security strategy can be created 
and supported by management, the security team, and 
the rest of the organization. Finally, security must be 
continually assessed and reassessed. With new and 
innovative threats, effective security cannot remain 
stationary. It must constantly evolve to meet new 
challenges. IT security for hospitals cannot be solved 
with a simple approach and a single piece of 
technology. It is an entire process among many people 
within the organization. By addressing these problems 
as they are - complex and multi-tiered - the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computing 
resources will be ensured. This will allow the hospital to 
function normally as a business and serve patients 
effectively and with privacy. 
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